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INFERRING TAX COMPLIANCE FROM PASS-THROUGH: EVIDENCE
FROM AIRBNB TAX ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS
Andrew J. Bibler, Keith F. Teltser, and Mark J. Tremblay*

I.

Introduction

T

HE rapid rise of online marketplaces such as Amazon,
eBay, Craigslist, and Airbnb has created contexts in
which tax obligations are ambiguous or difficult to enforce.
For example, before the recent June 2018 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., states were unable to
require online sellers lacking sufficient local presence (i.e.,
nexus) to collect and remit sales taxes.1 Because state and
local government agents cannot fully observe key details of
online transactions, they often rely on residents to self-report
the applicable taxes owed.2 Naturally, this enables individual market participants, some of whom may simply be unaware of their tax obligations, to evade with low probability of
detection.3
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1
The decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), established the nexus requirement. The decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair
Inc., 585 U.S. ___ (2018), overturned the earlier ruling.
2
See Agrawal and Fox (2017) for a survey of e-commerce tax enforcement
issues and policy proposals.
3
According to Manzi (2015), in the 27 states that enable individuals to
report use taxes on their income tax return, between 0.2% and 10.2% of
income tax returns reported any use tax in 2012. Bruce, Fox, and Luna
(2009) conservatively projected that forgone e-commerce state tax revenue
would be $11.4 billion in 2012 alone.

In some cases where nexus cannot be established, policymakers have worked to shift the burden of tax collection and
remittance to online platforms and retailers through the use
of voluntary collection agreements (VCAs).4 Online companies may be incentivized to enter VCAs to avoid facing
strict regulations, such as the ban New York City imposed
on Airbnb in late 2016 (Benner, 2016). However, whether efforts to fully enforce taxes on online activity are effective or
wasteful crucially depends on the rate of compliance among
individuals in the absence of formal enforcement.
In this paper, we show that an upper bound on preenforcement tax compliance can be obtained by estimating
the change in price after a tax becomes fully enforced. We apply this approach to Airbnb, which offers a particularly attractive setting. Jurisdictions with legislated taxes on hotels and
other short-term housing rentals, but no formal enforcement
agreements, must rely on hosts (suppliers) to collect and remit
the applicable taxes. If jurisdictions wish to locate and penalize evaders, they incur large enforcement costs.5 Since 2014,
however, Airbnb has entered into over 275 VCAs with jurisdictions across the United States to enforce sales and hotel
taxes.6 Once an agreement is implemented, Airbnb becomes
the tax remitter and collects taxes on every applicable transaction from renters (consumers) at the point of sale, which
increases compliance to 100% among transactions made on
the platform. Importantly, the enforced taxes are included in
the price presented on each property’s main page (see figure D1 in the online appendix), which mitigates the concern
that renters may underreact due to lack of salience (Chetty,
Looney, & Kroft, 2009). In addition to this application, we
show that our approach generalizes to contexts in which a
change in statutory incidence does not accompany enforcement, such as the “Amazon tax” and new laws enabled by the
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. decision.
Using data derived from Airbnb.com on over 170,000
properties spanning three years and 61 unique tax jurisdictions, we employ a difference-in-differences estimation
strategy that exploits variation in Airbnb tax enforcement
across time, location, and tax rate. First, we estimate the
effect of tax enforcement on booking prices, accounting
for location-specific shocks and unobserved heterogeneity
4
In some cases, policymakers have been able to establish nexus and compel online companies to collect and remit sales and use taxes. For example,
many states have passed laws, collectively referred to as the “Amazon tax,”
enabling them to cite the presence of facilities such as fulfillment centers
to establish nexus (Baugh, Ben-David, & Park, 2018).
5
Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that in the absence of formal enforcement, compliance among Airbnb hosts is low (Tuttle, 2013; Bruckner,
2016; Cohn, 2016).
6
See https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/airbnb-tax-collection-program-exp
ands-has-already-collected-110-million-for-governments/ and https://
www.airbnbcitizen.com/airbnb-tax-facts/.
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Abstract—Tax enforcement is especially costly when market participants
are difficult to observe. The benefits of enforcement depend crucially on preenforcement compliance. We derive an upper bound on pre-enforcement
compliance from the pass-through of newly enforced taxes. Using data on
Airbnb listings and the platform’s voluntary collection agreements, we find
that taxes are paid on, at most, 24% of Airbnb transactions prior to enforcement. We also find that demand for Airbnb listings is inelastic, driving three
key insights: the tax burden falls disproportionately on renters, the excess
burden is small, and tax enforcement is relatively ineffective at reducing
local Airbnb activity.

INFERRING TAX COMPLIANCE FROM PASS-THROUGH

A.

Related Literature

This paper is closely related to the literature focused on detecting and estimating tax evasion.8 One approach taken in the
literature involves comparing reported and actual aggregate
quantities to infer evasion.9 Another method exploits the IRS
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Programs, which pro7
To elaborate, our approach yields an estimated upper bound on preenforcement compliance of 24%, which occurs when supply is perfectly
elastic. If, however, we take 2.16 as the true price elasticity of supply, we can
combine it with our estimated price effect to infer a point estimate on preenforcement compliance of 7%. See section VE for detailed calculations.
8
See Slemrod (2016) for an overview of recent research on tax compliance
and enforcement.
9
For example, Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) compare income reported on tax returns to national income accounts.

vide data on compliance from randomized audits (Feinstein,
1991). Others compare administrative records of taxes paid
to actual tax liabilities, as in Dwenger et al. (2016), who find
that 20% of taxpayers are intrinsically motivated to comply
with a church tax in the absence of deterrence. The approach
we propose in this paper is most closely related to work that
uncovers evidence of evasion by exploiting changes in enforcement activity.10
In particular, our work contributes to research studying
compliance across different tax regimes. Slemrod (2008) and
Kopczuk et al. (2016) are especially relevant: they show that
the textbook principle of tax collection invariance can fail in
the presence of evasion. Specifically, Kopczuk et al. (2016)
find that economic tax incidence and tax revenues in the diesel
fuel market depend on which part of the supply chain bears
the statutory tax burden. Their results can be explained by heterogeneity in the ability to evade taxes throughout the supply
chain, though due to data limitations, the authors are unable
to estimate the extent of evasion. Doerrenberg and Duncan
(2014) use an experimental approach to show that when one
side of a market can evade taxes, the economic responses are
small and the benefits incurred by evaders are shared with the
side of the market that has no opportunity to evade. Our paper builds on this body of work by showing how researchers
can exploit heterogeneity in evasion ability to estimate tax
compliance and also provide insight into supply and demand
elasticities, tax incidence, and welfare effects.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature on the
sharing economy and Airbnb in particular. In their research
on the welfare effects of Airbnb entry, Farronato and Fradkin
(2018) find that while an increase in the prevalence of Airbnb
reduces hotel revenue, at least 70% of Airbnb bookings would
not have resulted in hotel bookings in the absence of Airbnb.
This is consistent with earlier work by Zervas, Proserpio,
and Byers (2017), which finds that an increase in Airbnb
prevalence is associated with lower hotel prices and revenues.
While these studies show that Airbnb is successfully competing with the hotel industry and increasing consumer surplus,
particularly during periods of high demand when hotels are
likely to be fully booked, there exist concerns that the growth
in this market makes residential housing less affordable (Barron, Kung, & Proserpio, 2021).
Finally, our work contributes to the growing literature on
the relationship between taxes, tax enforcement, and online
10
For example, Marion and Muehlegger (2008) study evasion by exploiting regulatory innovation in the diesel fuel market. Another example is
Wilking (2016), a working paper in which the author finds that Airbnb
hosts reduce asking prices in response to tax enforcement agreements, but
do so by less than the full amount of the tax. This suggests that, indeed, some
hosts do not comply in the absence of enforcement agreements. While the
finding is consistent with our results, the paper only considers asking price
responses in response to a much smaller number of tax enforcement agreements. As such, the author is only able to provide trace evidence of evasion
and insight on incidence. We consider changes in supply-side responses
and equilibrium outcomes using a much richer data set. This enables us to
make stronger claims on tax compliance rates and incidence and to provide
deeper insight into price elasticity of supply and demand as well as welfare
implications.
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across properties. We find that the enforcement of a 10% tax
reduces the price paid to hosts by 2.4% and increases the total
price renters pay by 7.6%. This yields an upper bound of 24%
compliance prior to full enforcement, suggesting that tax jurisdictions can increase compliance substantially by entering
a VCA. We show that this result is robust across specifications
and rule out potential threats to the validity of our estimated
upper bound.
We use the same approach to find that the enforcement of
a 10% tax reduces nights booked by 3.6%. This supports our
finding of pre-enforcement evasion; in the absence of evasion,
the equilibrium quantity should remain unchanged, and the
price paid to hosts should fall by exactly the amount of the
tax. Combining our estimated price and quantity effects, we
find that the elasticity of demand is relatively low (−0.48).
This suggests that Airbnb renters do not treat hotels and other
short-term rental options as close substitutes. Moreover, it
suggests that taxing Airbnb is not an effective policy lever
for those seeking to reduce Airbnb market activity in a given
area.
If we follow Farronato and Fradkin (2018) and assume that
Airbnb hosts are price takers, we are able to derive several additional insights. First, we adapt an intuitive result explained
nicely by Zoutman, Gavrilova, and Hopland (2018) to calculate that the price elasticity of supply is at least 1.5. This
means that hosts are relatively price sensitive and renters bear
a disproportionately large share of the economic tax burden.
This is consistent with Farronato and Fradkin (2018), who
estimate price elasticity of supply to be 2.16. In fact, we
show that combining their estimated supply elasticity with
our estimated effect of enforcement on price implies a preenforcement compliance rate of only 7%.7 Second, we use
back-of-the-envelope calculations to show that enforcement
increases tax revenue by at least $69 per property per month.
Multiplying $69 by 2,245, the average number of properties
in a treated tax jurisdiction, yields a monthly increase in tax
revenue of at least $155,000 from properties in the jurisdiction. Moreover, we find that enforcement appears to impose
a very small efficiency cost on the local market of $0.03 per
dollar of additional revenue.
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shopping. One of the seminal papers in this literature, Goolsbee (2000), finds that consumers facing higher local sales
taxes are more likely to make (untaxed) purchases online and
that taxing online purchases could significantly reduce the
number of Internet purchases. Other economists have studied this relationship using different online shopping data and
find similar results: Alm and Melnik (2005), Ballard and Lee
(2007), Scanlan (2007), Ellison and Ellison (2009b), Anderson et al. (2010), Einav et al. (2014), and Baugh et al. (2018).
Data

To motivate our conceptual framework and empirical strategy, we first describe our data on Airbnb and tax enforcement agreements. We start with information derived from
Airbnb.com on short-term rental listings, including daily
price, daily availability, daily bookings, date of booking, and
various time-invariant, property-specific characteristics such
as number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, maximum
number of guests, and reported coordinates. The data were
collected by AirDNA, a third-party source that frequently
scrapes property, availability, host, and review information
from the website.11
These data cover 27 major metropolitan areas across the
United States and include over 860,000 properties that were
active anytime between August 2014 and September 2017.12
The complete data set consists of more than 4,800 unique
city-county-state combinations, which we call tax jurisdictions. For several reasons, we initially restrict our sample to
the top 105 tax jurisdictions in terms of number of listings.
First, there is considerable heterogeneity across jurisdictions;
in particular, larger jurisdictions are much more likely to be
treated. Second, the largest jurisdictions are the most relevant for welfare analyses given the size of the markets and
the higher likelihood of entering into an Airbnb tax enforcement agreement. Finally, the larger jurisdictions are likely
to be more competitive given their denser concentration of
other short-term rental listings and lodging options. This is
important for when we use our estimated price and quantity
effects to provide insights on supply elasticity and welfare.
To this end, we also restrict our sample to listings that represent reasonably close substitutes to more traditional lodging
alternatives.13
We then aggregate our property-day data to the propertymonth level and supplement them with hand-collected data
11
This is in contrast to some papers that use administrative data from
Airbnb, such as Jaffe et al. (2018) and Farronato and Fradkin (2018).
AirDNA’s website is https://www.airdna.co/.
12
The 27 metros are Anchorage, Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Charlotte,
Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas–Fort Worth, Denver, Houston, Indianapolis,
Los Angeles, Louisville, Miami, Minneapolis–St. Paul, Nashville, New Orleans, New York City, Oakland, Orlando, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Salt Lake
City, San Diego, San Jose, Seattle, and Washington, DC.
13
In particular, we drop shared room listings (3.8% of the sample), properties with more than four bedrooms (2.9%), listings that allow more than
twelve guests (1.5%), and listings with an average asking price in the bottom
or top 10 percentile of their jurisdiction.

14
For details on current enforcement agreements, see https://www.airbnb.
com/help/topic/1236/occupancy-tax-collection-and-remittance. For two
examples of relevant news articles, see the following links that discuss the timing of enforcement in Washington, DC, and Salt Lake
City: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/12/los-angeles-passes-regulationtargeting-airbnb-rental-hosts.html and https://www.deseret.com/2017/2/
14/20606190/utah-airbnb-hosts-earned-35-5-million-welcomed-246-000
-people-in-2016.
15
To retain a few metros, we introduce within-metro-month-year treatment variation by including 13 jurisdictions that fall outside of the largest
105. See appendix C for more details.
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II.

on implementation dates and tax rates for all tax enforcement
agreements between Airbnb and the relevant state and local
governments. Airbnb publishes the locations and tax rates
of all their tax enforcement agreements, which enables us
to search for primary and secondary sources (i.e., local government websites and news articles) detailing the timing of
implementation.14 Using these sources, we are able to confirm treatment dates for all but one location (Palo Alto, CA).
The enforced tax rates vary by jurisdiction. They also vary
over time within jurisdiction, as some jurisdictions are affected by subsequent agreements or changes in tax rates. As
such, we are able to exploit variation in the timing, magnitude
(both within and between cross-sectional units), and location
of tax enforcement.
To alleviate concerns about potential confounders, we drop
treatment and control jurisdictions with regulatory changes
and changes in self-enforcement efforts during the sample period. Also, since our preferred specification includes metromonth-year fixed effects (see section IV), we only keep jurisdictions if they are part of metros containing within-metromonth-year treatment variation.15 Our resulting estimation
sample includes properties from 61 jurisdictions. Of these 61
jurisdictions, 38 are treated by a voluntary collection agreement on one of 14 unique initial treatment dates ranging from
February 2015 through June 2017. Thus, we have between 6
and 34 months (18.7 on average) of preperiod data and 3 to
31 months (18.3 on average) of postperiod data for treated jurisdictions. The remaining 23 jurisdictions are never treated
during the sample period. The average enforced tax rate is
7.1%. However, this rate includes many property-month observations that are not affected by a tax enforcement agreement. Conditional on being subject to any nonzero tax, the
average is 11.2%. Of the 38 treated jurisdictions, 15 experience one increase in the enforced tax rate during the postperiod, and one experiences two such increases. In appendix
C, we discuss in detail which jurisdictions we keep and drop
and provide the relevant justifications. We also present more
information on timing of enforcement agreements and magnitudes of enforced taxes.
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the most relevant
property and property-month variables. Our main outcome
of interest is booking price, defined as the posted price (i.e.,
asking price) for a night that has been booked. Note that the
observed booking price is tax inclusive before an enforcement agreement is implemented and tax exclusive after the
agreement is implemented. For brevity, we also refer to this
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TABLE 1.—SUMMARY STATISTICS
Mean

Std. Dev.

133.68
6.05
0.07
137.28
19.67

78.50
11.96
0.06
88.58
12.88

25th Percentile

Median

75th Percentile

Observations

163
7
0.14
167.93
30

963,352
2,590,954
2,590,954
1,998,846
2,590,954

2
2
5
1
5.00
200
85
15
3
0
0
20

170,619
170,324
170,619
170,619
106,304
170,619
170,619
170,619
170,320
170,619
158,074
165,364

Panel A: Property-Month Level Summary
Booking Price
Days Booked / Month
Tax Rate
Asking Price
Nights Avail.

83.34
0
0.00
83.82
3

115
0
0.09
117.33
28

Panel B: Property Level Summary
1.41
1.35
3.67
0.70
4.69
156.88
55.40
8.89
3.60
0.13
0.18
14.77

0.93
0.62
2.13
0.46
0.45
316.12
60.63
18.64
17.24
0.34
0.38
11.67

1
1
2
0
4.50
0
0
0
1
0
0
7

1
1
3
1
4.80
0
40
0
2
0
0
12

Sample excludes listings for shared rooms, properties that have more than 4 bedrooms, properties that have a guest limit of more than twelve, and properties for which average asking price falls in bottom or top
decile of the jurisdiction’s distribution.

as the price paid to hosts. The average booking price in our
sample is roughly $134 per night. This is a few dollars lower
than the average asking price, which is defined as the posted
price for an available night of roughly $137.
Our second outcome of interest is the number of nights
booked per property-month, which is 6.05 on average in our
estimation sample. Note that this variable represents the number of nights that were reserved during that month for any
future stay. This means that the number of nights booked in
a given property-month can exceed 31. We use this measure
rather than the number of nights a listing was occupied during a particular month, because Airbnb enforces the tax on
all transactions made on or after the agreement’s implementation date. For example, an enforcement agreement in Los
Angeles went into effect in August 2016. A booking made
in July 2016 for a stay in October 2016 would not have been
taxed through the website, but a booking made in September
2016 for a stay in October 2016 would.
It is important to note that bookings are not directly observed. Each property’s calendar of availability is scraped
every one to three days to detect any changes. A change in
availability suggests a booking has occurred, which can be
verified when a renter writes a review of the host and property
after his or her stay.16 The primary concern with this approach
is that we may incorrectly infer that a booking occurs and
thus overmeasure the number of nights booked when a host
no longer wants to rent out his or her property for a particular
16
We purchased the scraped data from AirDNA. For roughly the first year
of our sample, Airbnb disclosed whether each unavailable date was booked
or made unavailable (i.e., blocked) by the host. Since Airbnb stopped disclosing this distinction, AirDNA started predicting which calendar changes
are bookings and which are blocked by training an algorithm on the data
they have from the full-information period. We use these data to generate
our variables measuring nights booked and property availability.

night and blocks that night. This type of measurement error
can lead to noisier estimates on the quantity of nights booked,
but would bias our estimates only if the enforced tax rate is
correlated with the measurement error. This could be true if,
for example, the introduction of a tax enforcement agreement
causes hosts to reduce their stated availability and those reductions are incorrectly inferred to be bookings. However,
given that these Airbnb tax enforcement agreements reduce
hosts’ marginal costs, supply responses are likely to be positive rather than negative. A related concern is the possibility that stated availability does not accurately reflect actual
availability, as discussed in Farronato and Fradkin (2018). In
particular, the authors point out that hosts may be better at updating their stated availability during periods of high demand.
If true, this implies that we might overmeasure nights booked
during such periods. However, in our preferred specification
discussed in section IV, we are able to alleviate this concern
by including metro-month-year fixed effects to absorb the
effects of idiosyncratic demand shocks.
Going through the remaining summary statistics in table
1, we see an average availability of 19.7 nights per propertymonth. This variable measures the number of nights per
property-month that the listing is booked or available to be
booked. Table 1 also presents additional summary statistics
of interest to provide a fuller picture of the additional costs
associated with Airbnb bookings and the substitutability between hotels and Airbnb listings. Among the property rentals
in our sample, 70% are for the entire home or apartment. The
average security deposit is $156.88, the average cleaning fee
is $55.40, and the average extra person fee is $8.89. The average Airbnb rental has 1.41 bedrooms and 1.35 bathrooms,
supports up to 3.67 guests, and requires a minimum stay of
3.6 nights. Roughly 13% of Airbnb listings are classified
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Bedrooms
Bathrooms
Max Guests
Entire Home/Apt
Rating
Security Deposit
Cleaning Fee
Extra People Fee
Minimum Stay (Days)
Business Ready
Superhost
Number of Photos
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business-ready and 18% of properties are listed by superhosts.17
III.

Conceptual Framework

17
The requirements for a property to be classified business-ready are
outlined here: https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1185/what-makes-alisting-business-travel-ready. The requirements to be a superhost are outlined here: https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/828/what-is-a-superhost.
18
For simplicity, suppose that each host offers a single listing.
19
While it is possible that noncompliance persists after an agreement if
buyers and sellers can circumvent the website to conduct business off the
platform, several mechanisms in place strongly deter such behavior. First,
Airbnb blocks the ability for hosts and renters to share contact information
until a booking is made. Second, Airbnb warns its customers about phishing
and the risks of sending payments to hosts outside the platform. Third, hosts
and renters forgo Airbnb’s payment protection and legal protection if they
subvert the website booking process.
20
Although sales, hotel, and use taxes are ad valorem, we model the problem using a per unit tax throughout the paper for simplicity.
21
Similar to the risks faced by evaders, one might think that compliance is
also costly. Compliance costs, C ≥ 0, can be incorporated such that SC =
SC (P − t − C), which implies that S = (1 − λ)S E + λSC = S(P − λt −
λC − (1 − λ)R).

λ≤

P1 − P2
p
P1 − P2 − (1 − λ)R
≤
=
≡ λ.
t
t
t

(1)

22
Note that this implicitly assumes that R < t. This makes intuitive sense;
no host would evade if R ≥ t.
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In this section, we illustrate the impact of tax enforcement
on the short-term rental market and derive an estimable upper bound on pre-enforcement compliance. This is simple
to present when hosts are price takers, which follows the assumption made in Farronato and Fradkin (2018). In appendix
A, we show that our bounding argument is also valid under
imperfect competition when there is little to no net exit of
properties from the Airbnb market following a tax enforcement agreement. Furthermore, we show in appendix B that
an analogous bounding approach is available in cases where
full enforcement does not affect statutory incidence, which
is particularly relevant in light of the recent South Dakota v.
Wayfair Inc. U.S. Supreme Court decision.
Suppose price-taking hosts offer short-term housing
rentals across two broadly defined periods.18 In the first period, individual hosts bear the burden of collecting and remitting any applicable sales and lodging taxes with the possibility of evading. In the second period, the statutory burden of
the tax shifts away from hosts toward Airbnb, which collects
and remits all applicable taxes from renters at the point of
sale. Neither hosts nor renters can evade taxes when booking
through the website under this regime.19
Consider first the hosts who comply with the tax in the
first period. For these hosts, the supply of accommodations
is given by SC (P − t ), where P denotes the price renters
pay to hosts and t denotes the tax remitted by hosts.20
Next, consider hosts who evade taxes in the first period.
The supply of accommodations that evade taxes is given by
S E (P − R) where R ≥ 0 denotes the marginal costs associated with the risks of evading. Now suppose that the supply
curves are linear, the mass of hosts is 1, and let λ ∈ [0, 1]
denote the proportion of tax-compliant listings. This implies that the market supply of accommodations is given by
S = (1 − λ)S E + λSC = S(P − λt − (1 − λ)R).21 The first
period equilibrium price, P = P1 , which is tax inclusive, satis-

fies S(P1 − λt − (1 − λ)R) = D(P1 ). Thus, the price paid by
renters in the first period is P1 , and the average price received
by hosts is P1 − λt − (1 − λ)R. In the second period, the
statutory tax regime changes; the statutory burden of the tax
now falls on renters and is perfectly enforced by Airbnb. Thus,
the second period equilibrium price, P = P2 , which is tax exclusive, satisfies S(P2 ) = D(P2 + t ). In this case, renters pay
P2 + t and hosts receive P2 .
The progression from period 0, the hypothetical initial notax period, through period 2, where taxes are collected from
renters at the point of sale, is presented graphically in figures
1a and 1b. The initial impact of individual hosts incurring
the statutory burden of hotel and sales taxes—that is, moving
from period 0 to period 1—is displayed in figure 1a. The
tax introduction increases hosts’ marginal costs, leading to
a leftward shift in the supply curve equal to λt + (1 − λ)R.
Next, the impact of a tax enforcement being reached—that is,
moving from period 1 to period 2—is depicted in figure 1b.
Airbnb enforcement agreements shift the statutory burden
of the tax onto renters and away from hosts. Thus, hosts’
marginal costs return to their period 0 level, which is reflected
by a rightward shift in the supply curve equal to λt + (1 −
λ)R. Contemporaneously, given that renters are unable to
evade and assuming the tax is salient, demand falls by the
full magnitude of the tax.
If all hosts comply in period 1, such that λ = 1, then the
principle of tax collection invariance holds, meaning the equilibrium price that hosts receive, price that renters pay, and
quantity of nights booked are the same in periods 1 and 2.
However, if some hosts evade in period 1, such that λ < 1,
the enforcement agreement increases the tax wedge from
λt + (1 − λ)R to t.22 This implies that enforcement increases
the average price renters pay, reduces the average price received by hosts, and equilibrium quantity falls. If λ and R are
observable, then we can determine the deadweight loss associated with taxing Airbnb rentals, the marginal deadweight
loss due to Airbnb enforcement, and the local slope of the
supply curve. However, we do not observe λ or R in our setting. This means that the magnitude of the supply shift, and
thus the slope of the supply curve, are unknown.
Although we do not observe λ and R, we can use the extreme case where supply is perfectly elastic to infer an upper
bound on compliance. As shown in figure 1c, the largest possible shift in the supply curve is the distance between the two
observed equilibrium prices paid to hosts, P1 and P2 , which
occurs when supply is perfectly elastic. Again, note that P1 is
the tax-inclusive, pre-enforcement equilibrium price, while
P2 is the tax-exclusive post-enforcement equilibrium price.
This implies that λt + (1 − λ)R ≤ P1 − P2 . Thus, we can
derive an upper bound on the pre-enforcement compliance
rate:
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FIGURE 1.—TAX EVASION AND ENFORCEMENT ON THE AIRBNB MARKETPLACE

The power of this approach is its simplicity, as it only requires
the practitioner to observe the tax magnitude along with equilibrium prices under partial and full compliance. In practice,
we estimate this directly using the reduced-form effect of tax
enforcement on the price paid to hosts. A smaller difference
between P1 and P2 implies a larger portion of the enforced
tax is passed through to renters, which also implies a smaller
upper bound on pre-enforcement compliance. Note that the
larger the costs associated with evading are, the more conservative the estimated upper bound will be. Recall that in this
model, we implicitly assume that the taxes are salient. Our
approach may underestimate the conservative upper bound
if, due to less-than-full salience, willingness to pay does not
fall by the full amount of the tax.
We also consider the other extreme, in which there is no
compliance or risk of evading (i.e., λ = R = 0), to infer a
lower bound on the elasticity of supply. This case is depicted
in figure 1d. The tax enforcement agreement does not induce
a supply shock when pre-enforcement compliance is 0% and
there is no risk of evading, implying that any change in the
average price paid to hosts and nights booked is fully attributable to a demand curve shift. Thus, we can trace out the
steepest possible supply curve using the observed pre- and

post-enforcement prices and quantities, as shown in figure
1d, and infer a lower bound on the price elasticity of supply. This exercise produces two key insights. First, as the
price elasticity of supply approaches the lower bound, the
implied estimate of pre-enforcement compliance approaches
0%. Second, as the lower bound of the price elasticity of supply approaches infinity, the upper bound of pre-enforcement
compliance approaches λ.
IV.

Estimation

Our primary goals are to obtain an upper bound on preenforcement tax compliance and provide insight into tax incidence in the sharing economy. To this end, we estimate
the effects of tax enforcement agreements on average booking prices and nights booked per property-month. Although
Airbnb tax enforcement policies vary at the tax jurisdiction level, we use property as our cross-sectional unit to
control for property-specific observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Consider the following difference-in-differences
specification:
ln(Yi jmt ) = γ ln(1 + τ jmt ) + αi + δmt + μi jmt .

(2)
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23
See, for example, Marion and Muehlegger (2008) and Kopczuk et al.
(2016).
24
For example, agreements in Cleveland, OH, and Santa Clara, CA, preceded large sporting events. In those cases, the metro-month-year fixed
effects absorb the demand shock that affected jurisdictions close to those
events.
25
Booking price regressions are weighted by the number of nights booked.
We include another set of estimates without weights, showing that our results are not sensitive to weighting. Also, in an alternate specification, we
implement county-month-year fixed effects and find similar results. However, the inclusion of county-month-year fixed effects is more restrictive
since fewer tax jurisdictions are part of counties that exhibit within-countymonth-year variation in tax enforcement and magnitude. In another alternate set of specifications, we replace property fixed effects with tax jurisdiction fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved or omitted
jurisdiction-specific characteristics and control for time-invariant observed
property characteristics, including number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and
maximum guests.

informally test the effectiveness of using metro-month-year
fixed effects and property-level characteristics to control for
observable and unobservable differences between treatment
and control jurisdictions.26 Focusing on the tests that include
metro-month-year fixed effects, which are analogous to our
preferred specification, the estimated difference in log bookings is −0.003. This is a relatively precise 0, as the clusterrobust standard error is 0.019. The estimated difference in log
booking price is 0.022 with a standard error of 0.042. These
tests suggest that, conditional on the included controls, neither bookings nor prices predict an eventual tax enforcement
agreement. While this is also true when we only control for
month-year fixed effects, the magnitudes of the differences
between our treatment and control jurisdictions are considerably larger.
Using the same approach, we also test for pretreatment
differences in market characteristics that may be correlated
with prices or pass-through rates using jurisdiction-month
level aggregates. These characteristics include the number
of properties listed, total supply (i.e., total nights available),
nights booked, a measure of excess capacity (proportion of
properties booked at least once), and the booking price distribution (25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile). We
present the test results along with sample means and standard
deviations in table D2 in appendix D. We find evidence that
treated jurisdictions are larger on average, implying a larger
number of properties, nights available, and bookings. However, because we include property and tax jurisdiction fixed
effects in our analyses, the primary threat to the validity of
difference-in-differences is differential rates of change between the treatment and control groups over time. Thus, for
all these characteristics, we also test for differential changes
in characteristics over the pretreatment months. When we
condition on metro-month-year fixed effects, as we do in our
preferred regression specifications, we find no statistically
significant differences between treated and control jurisdictions at all.
Next, we test for the presence of differential pretrends in the
outcomes of interest between treatment and control jurisdictions, which would threaten the credibility of our differencein-differences estimator. We estimate the following flexible
event-study specification:
ln(Yi jmt ) = αi + δmt +

7


γk D j 1(t − Tj = k) + μi jmt , (3)

k=−5

where Tj is the month of jurisdiction j’s tax enforcement
agreement and D j is a binary treatment indicator equal to
1 if jurisdiction j is ever treated. From the set of observed
treatment dates, we randomly assign synthetic enforcement
dates to jurisdictions that are never treated. The coefficients
γk measure the effects of tax enforcement on the outcome
26
Note that we cannot condition on tax jurisdiction or property fixed effects in these tests because the indicator for eventual treatment does not
vary within jurisdiction or property.
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In equation (2), Yi jmt is the outcome of interest for property
i in tax jurisdiction j and metro m in month-year t. Our treatment variable is τ jmt , which is the tax rate enforced directly
through Airbnb.com in jurisdiction j at time t. This variable
equals 0 in the absence of a formal tax enforcement agreement
and becomes positive after an agreement is implemented. Following the literature, we estimate a log-log specification in
order to interpret the effects of tax enforcement on the equilibrium outcomes in terms of percentage changes.23 We include property fixed effects, αi , to control for time-invariant
observed and unobserved property-specific characteristics.
We also include flexible time effects to control for timespecific shocks to a particular area, such as metro-specific
seasonality and idiosyncratic demand shocks.24 Equation (2)
represents our preferred specification, which includes metromonth-year fixed effects δmt .25
The parameter of interest, γ, represents the percent change
in Y associated with a 1% increase in (1 + τ), which closely
approximates a 1 percentage point increase in the tax rate enforced through the platform. As long as supply and demand
have some nonzero and finite slope and there is less-than-full
compliance pre-enforcement, then our conceptual framework
yields unambiguous predictions on our two main parameters
of interest. First, the effect of tax enforcement on booking
price, γP , is negative but greater than −1. That is, the average
price paid to hosts does not fall by the full amount of the tax,
which in turn implies that the tax-inclusive post-enforcement
price renters pay increases. Second, due to this price effect, the effect of tax enforcement on nights booked (γQ ) is
negative.
To lend credibility to our empirical strategy, we first test
for pretreatment differences in the outcomes of interest between the treatment and control jurisdictions (see table D1 in
appendix D, which also includes sample averages by treatment status). To test these differences, we use only pretreatment property-month observations and regress each outcome
variable of interest on an indicator for whether a property
is in an eventually treated jurisdiction. In the first set of
tests, we condition on month-year fixed effects. In the second set, we condition on metro-month-year fixed effects and
property-level controls. Using both specifications allows us to
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FIGURE 2.—EFFECT OF TAX ENFORCEMENT ON LOG BOOKING PRICE

variables of interest k months relative to the enforcement.
For values k < −1, the coefficients γk test for the presence
of pretrends. In practice, we collapse periods more than seven
months after enforcement into period k = 7. We omit period
k = −1 when estimating booking price effects but omit period k = −2 when estimating the effects on nights booked
to test whether renters temporally shift their booking activity to the month before an enforcement agreement goes into
effect.
Figure 2 shows that there is no visual or statistically significant evidence of a pretrend in booking prices, suggesting
that the parallel trends assumption holds. The dashed lines
represent the 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors robust to jurisdiction-level clustering. The figure also
shows a clear decrease in booking prices starting one month
after a tax enforcement agreement goes into effect. Figure
3 also shows no evidence of a pretrend in nights booked.
While the nights-booked estimates are less precise than the
booking price estimates, there does appear to be a reduction
in nights booked following enforcement. The positive coefficient in period k = −1, while not statistically significant,
suggests that renters may indeed be aware of the upcoming
tax enforcement implementation and behave accordingly. We
test this further in section VB, and find that strategic behavior
does not appear to undermine our central estimates.
V.

Results

In this section, we present several sets of results. To start,
we present our main results that allow us to bound preenforcement compliance, the price elasticity of supply, and
estimate the price elasticity of demand in the Airbnb market. Next, we show that our main estimates are robust to

alternative sample restrictions, estimation choices, and the
possibility of strategic booking behavior. We also show that
supply-side responses to enforcement are consistent with our
main results. Finally, to provide a richer understanding of
the Airbnb market, we examine heterogeneity in enforcement effects by listing type, across the distribution of asking
prices, and then calculate the welfare implications of Airbnb
taxation.

A.

Main Results

Before discussing our main results that use differences in
the size of the tax, we summarize the results using a traditional difference-in-differences framework. This is identical to equation (2), except we replace the treatment variable
ln(1 + τ jmt ) with a binary indicator equal to 1 in a given
jurisdiction-month if there is any tax enforcement agreement
in place. This approach provides a straightforward comparison of booking prices and nights booked before and after
enforcement, though it is limited by the fact that it eliminates useful variation in tax rates within jurisdictions across
time. The estimates are reported in table 2. In our preferred
specification (column 1), the estimated average effect of enforcement on booking prices is −0.032 and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that booking prices
fall by 3.2% when a tax enforcement agreement is in place.
Considering the average enforced tax rate is 11.2%, this suggests that booking prices fall by 28.6% of the enforced tax.
Similarly, we estimate that the number of nights booked decreases by about 4.5%, suggesting that a 1 percentage point
increase in the enforced tax rate reduces nights booked by
roughly 0.4%.
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This figure presents the time-disaggregated estimated effect of enforcement agreements on the natural log of booking price. This approach interacts a binary treatment indicator with month relative to enforcement and
includes metro-month-year fixed effects as well as property fixed effects. As in our main set of estimates, this estimation sample excludes listings for shared rooms, properties that have more than 4 bedrooms, properties
that have a guest limit of more than twelve, and properties for which average asking price falls in the bottom or top decile of the jurisdiction’s distribution. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the tax jurisdiction
level.
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FIGURE 3.—EFFECT OF TAX ENFORCEMENT ON LOG NIGHTS BOOKED

TABLE 2.—TAX ENFORCEMENT, BOOKING PRICE, AND BOOKINGS: STANDARD DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES SPECIFICATION
Panel A: ln(Booking Price)
Tax × Post
Observations

−0.032***

−0.038***

(0.007)
935,691

(0.008)
935,683

−0.030*
(0.016)
935,691

−0.045**
(0.020)
2,586,260
√

−0.054**
(0.027)
2,586,260
√

−0.047**
(0.022)
2,586,260
√

–
–
√

–
–
–
√

–
–
–
–
√

−0.024***
(0.006)
963,352

−0.024***
(0.007)
963,344

−0.025
(0.017)
963,352

−0.046***
(0.016)
2,590,954

−0.049**
(0.021)
2,590,954

−0.033
(0.024)
2,590,954

–
√
√
√

–
√
√

–
√
√

–
√

–
–
√

Panel B: ln(1+Nights Booked)
Tax × Post
Observations
Property FE
Tax Jurisdiction FE
Property-level Controls
Metro-Month-Year FE
County-Month-Year FE
Month-Year FE

–
–

–

–
–

–

Regressions of the natural log of booking price (panel A) and the number of bookings (panel B) on a dummy variable version of the treatment. Each outcome is estimated using six different specifications. Column 1
includes property fixed effects and metro-month-year fixed effects. Column 2 includes property fixed effects and county-month-year fixed effects. Column 3 includes property fixed effects and month-year fixed effects.
Columns 4 to 6 repeat the three specifications replacing property fixed effects with tax jurisdiction fixed effects and including controls for property-level characteristics. The estimation sample excludes listings for
shared rooms, properties that have more than 4 bedrooms, properties that have a guest limit of twelve, or properties for which average asking price falls in the bottom or top decile of the jurisdiction’s distribution.
Estimates for booking price are weighted by the number of bookings contributing to the average monthly booking price observations. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the tax jurisdiction level. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ p < 0.10.

Panel A of table 3 presents our main results on the booking
price paid to hosts, where each estimate can be interpreted
as the percentage change in price associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the enforced tax rate. Columns 1
through 3 present the estimates when using property-specific
fixed effects. In practice, this approach identifies the effect
of interest using deviations from property-level averages.
The results presented in columns 1 and 2 come from specifications allowing for location-time-specific idiosyncrasies.
The column 1 specification includes metro-specific monthyear fixed effects, while the column 2 specification includes

county-specific month-year fixed effects. These estimates are
−0.240 and −0.332, respectively, and both are statistically
significant at the 1% level. We prefer the specification including metro-month-year fixed effects, since including countymonth-year fixed effects absorbs a substantial amount of useful variation.27 The third column presents the estimate when
we control for a location-invariant flexible time trend using
27
Specifically, 11 of the 27 counties in our estimation sample lack within
county-month-year tax variation because they contain only one sufficiently
large tax jurisdiction.
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This figure presents the time-disaggregated estimated effect of enforcement agreements on the natural log of nights booked. This approach interacts a binary treatment indicator with month relative to enforcement and
includes metro-month-year fixed effects as well as property fixed effects. This figure omits month k = −2 instead of k = −1, so we can inspect whether renters appear to be strategically altering the timing of their
bookings around enforcement. As in our main set of estimates, this estimation sample excludes listings for shared rooms, properties that have more than 4 bedrooms, properties that have a guest limit of more than
twelve, and properties for which average asking price falls in the bottom or top decile of the jurisdiction’s distribution. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the tax jurisdiction level.
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TABLE 3.—TAX ENFORCEMENT, BOOKING PRICE, AND BOOKINGS: DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES SPECIFICATION EXPLOITING TAX RATE VARIATION
Panel A: ln(Booking Price)
ln(1 + tax)
Observations

−0.240***
(0.059)
935,691

ln(1 + tax)

−0.361*

Observations

(0.211)
2,586,260
√

−0.332***
(0.070)
935,683

−0.196**
(0.087)
935,691

−0.217***
(0.046)
963,352

−0.229***
(0.058)
963,344

−0.166
(0.108)
963,352

−0.431**
(0.186)
2,590,954

−0.340
(0.204)
2,590,954

−0.469***
(0.120)
2,590,954

–
√
√
√

–
√
√

–
√
√

–
√

–
–
√

Panel B: ln(1+Nights Booked)

–
–
√
–
–

−0.522***
(0.138)
2,586,260
√

–
–
–
√

–
–
–
–
√

–

–
–

–

Regressions of the natural log of booking price (panel A) and the number of bookings (panel B) on our treatment variable. Each outcome is estimated using six different specifications. Column 1 includes property
fixed effects and metro-month-year fixed effects. Column 2 includes property fixed effects and county-month-year fixed effects. Column 3 includes property fixed effects and month-year fixed effects. Columns 4 to
6 repeat the three specifications replacing property fixed effects with tax jurisdiction fixed effects and including controls for property-level characteristics. The estimation sample excludes listings for shared rooms,
properties that have more than four bedrooms, properties that have a guest limit of twelve, or properties for which average asking price falls in the bottom or top decile of the jurisdiction’s distribution. Estimates for
booking price are weighted by the number of bookings contributing to the average monthly booking price observations. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the tax jurisdiction level. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
and ∗ p < 0.10.

month-year fixed effects. The estimated effect is −0.196 and
is significant at the 5% level. We consider this a naive estimate because it does not control for idiosyncratic shocks,
differences in seasonality, or differences in growth across
location.
In columns 4 through 6 of table 3, panel A, we present
the estimated effects of interest from specifications that exploit deviations from jurisdiction-level, rather than propertylevel, mean values by replacing the property fixed effects with
tax jurisdiction fixed effects. We also include time-invariant
property-level characteristics as controls in these three specifications.28 The results presented in columns 4 and 5 come
from specifications controlling for metro-month-year fixed
effects and county-month-year fixed effects. The estimates
are −0.217 and −0.229, respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 1% level. The last column presents
the estimate when we only include location-invariant monthyear fixed effects. The estimated effect is −0.166 but is not
statistically significant at conventional levels. Notably, the estimated price effects are similar across all six specifications,
all are statistically distinguishable from full pre-enforcement
compliance (−1) at the 1% level, and none are statistically
distinguishable from our preferred estimate of −0.240.29
Our preferred estimate of γP = −0.240 implies that the
enforcement of a 10% tax reduces the booking price paid
to hosts by 2.4%. This means that the majority of the tax—
28
These controls include number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms,
maximum allowed guests, cleaning fee, security deposit, fee for each additional guest, listing type, rating, strictness of cancellation policy, minimum duration, number of photos, superhost designation, and business-ready
designation.
29
Note that all of these specifications are weighted by the number of nights
booked in the month of the observation. We show the unweighted estimate
from our preferred specification in column 4 of table D3, which is very
similar at −0.235 and significant at the 1% level. While we don’t present
all six specifications, the other unweighted estimates are very similar to
their weighted counterparts as well.

the remaining 7.6% of a 10% tax—is passed through as an
increase in the tax-inclusive price renters pay following enforcement. In the extreme case of zero pre-enforcement compliance among hosts (i.e., λ = 0), this estimate implies that
hosts in the Airbnb market bear no more than 24% of the
tax burden. In the presence of some pre-enforcement compliance among hosts, part of this estimated reduction in booking prices is driven by compliant hosts being relieved of their
statutory tax obligation. If true, this means that 24% is actually an overestimate of the economic tax burden borne by
hosts in the Airbnb market.
Next, we infer an upper bound on pre-enforcement tax
compliance among Airbnb hosts from our booking price
estimate:
λ≡
≈

p1 − p2
p/p1
p
p/p1
≈
=
=
t
t
t/p1
τ
 ln(p)
= −γP .30
 ln(1 + τ)

(4)

That is, our estimated effect of the enforced tax rate on booking price paid to hosts, γP = −0.240, implies that taxes are
paid on no more than 24% of nights booked in the absence
of formal Airbnb tax enforcement agreements. If we take
into account the standard error of 0.059, the 95% confidence
interval ranges from 12.2% to 35.8%.
Next, we turn to panel B of table 3. This row of results
reflects the percentage change in nights booked associated
with a 1 percentage point increase in the enforced tax rate,
30
The first approximation is used because taxes on Airbnb bookings are
actually ad valorem (τ), not a fixed per unit amount t, as we model throughout the paper for convenience. To see why the second approximation is
true, suppose that the tax rate enforced is a 1% ad valorem tax. Before enforcement, the enforced tax rate (τ) is 0. Thus, τ = 0.01 = τ, which is
approximately equal to  ln(1 + τ) = ln(1.01) − ln(1) = 0.00995.
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Property FE
Tax Jurisdiction FE
Property-level Controls
Metro-Month-Year FE
County-Month-Year FE
Month-Year FE

−0.392
(0.290)
2,586,260
√
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31
Ideally, we could decompose the effect on nights booked into intensive and extensive margin effects. However, determining the number of
reservations and nights booked per reservation using scraped data relies on
inferring that back-to-back newly booked nights are part of a single reservation unless AirDNA can distinguish multiple reservations from review data,
which may introduce measurement error. When we estimate the extensive
margin effect, we find a statistically insignificant negative effect on number
of reservations that is roughly half the size of our preferred estimate of the
effect on nights booked.
32
Note that if the tax is not fully salient, this calculation will tend to
underestimate the true price elasticity of demand (Ellison & Ellison, 2009a;
Blake et al., 2021).
33
These arguments are discussed in section III and displayed graphically
in figures 1b through 1d.

the long-term rental market or for hosts listing their primary
residence to exit the rental business altogether.34
B.

Robustness Checks

We now show that our main results are robust to different sample restriction choices, strategic timing of bookings
among renters, and weighting our booking price regressions
by the number of nights booked per property-month. Each
column in table D3 in appendix D presents the results of a
robustness check using our preferred specification that includes property fixed effects and metro-month-year fixed effects. In the first column, we present the estimates we obtain
when we do not impose any restrictions on the characteristics
of properties included in our estimation sample. We find that
the effect of the enforced tax rate on booking price is −0.218,
significant at the 1% level, and statistically indistinguishable
from our preferred estimate of −0.240. With respect to nights
booked, we find that the effect of the enforced tax rate is
−0.389, significant at the 10% level, and again statistically
indistinguishable from our preferred estimate of −0.361.
Columns 2 and 3 present robustness checks where we deviate from our preferred empirical strategy by instead restricting our estimation sample to properties with average asking
prices that fall within the middle 90% and 50%, respectively,
of their jurisdictions’ distributions. This is in contrast to our
main sample, where we include the middle 80% and omit
properties falling in the top and bottom 10%. Again, we obtain statistically indistinguishable estimates of the effect of
enforcement on booking price and nights booked. Using the
middle 90%, the booking price estimate is −0.229 and significant at the 1% level, and the nights-booked estimate is
−0.334 but not statistically significant at conventional levels
or distinguishable from our preferred estimate. When we restrict to the middle 50% of the asking price distribution, the
booking price estimate is −0.259 and significant at the 1%
level. Again, the nights-booked estimate of −0.316 is not statistically significant at conventional levels or distinguishable
from our preferred estimate.
In column 4, we show that our preferred booking price estimate is not substantially affected by the fact that we weight
the regression by the number of nights booked per propertymonth; the unweighted booking price estimate is −0.235,
significant at the 1% level and statistically indistinguishable
from the preferred estimate. In column 5, we present the estimated effect of enforcement on nights booked after dropping
properties that are never booked throughout the sample period. The estimated effect of −0.462 is slightly larger in magnitude, statistically significantly different from 0 at the 5%
level, but not statistically distinguishable from our preferred
estimate.
Finally, in columns 6 and 7 of table D3, we compare two
additional specifications with our main estimates on booking
34
This hints at a natural extension, presented in section VC, where we
estimate heterogeneity by type of rental unit.
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estimated using the same six specifications as the booking price results in panel A. They range from −0.340 to
−0.522, but none appear to be statistically distinguishable
from one another.31 Focusing on our preferred specification
(column 1), we estimate that a 1 percentage point increase
in the enforced tax rate reduces nights booked by 0.361%
(p = 0.09). This negative quantity effect suggests that the
negative demand-side response to tax enforcement dominates any contemporaneous positive supply-side response
that might exist, which is consistent with only partial preenforcement host compliance. Given that the gap between
the tax-inclusive price paid by renters and booking price received by hosts must equal the size of the enforced tax rate,
we can define γP+τ = 1 + γP = 0.760 to be the relationship
between the enforced tax rate and tax-inclusive price paid by
renters. We can then combine our estimated price and quantity effects to calculate the average price elasticity of demand
for nights booked across listings, which is relatively inelastic:
demand = γQ /γP+τ = −0.361
= −0.48.32
0.760
Even though the assumption that hosts are price takers is
not necessary for our bounding argument to hold, making the
assumption allows us to identify a lower bound on the price
elasticity of supply of Airbnb listings. Given the nature of
Airbnb tax enforcement agreements, the supply curve cannot
be less elastic than what the estimated effects on booking
price and quantity imply in the hypothetical scenario where
supply does not shift at all.33 In this hypothetical scenario,
our estimates simply represent the equilibrium effects of a
reduction in willingness-to-pay equal to the magnitude of
the enforced tax rate, which allows us to trace out the local
supply curve. If, in fact, there is any positive supply shock,
using this simple approach would lead us to underestimate
the true elasticity of supply. Using the ratio of the estimated
effects of the enforced tax rate on booking price and nights
booked, we calculate the lower bound of the price elasticity
−0.361
= 1.5.
of supply to be supply = γQ /γP = −0.240
Given our lower-bound estimate, supply appears to be relatively elastic in the Airbnb market. This is consistent with
Farronato and Fradkin (2018), who estimate the price elasticity of supply in the Airbnb market to be 2.16. This is plausible
because of the clear outside options available to many hosts
and the low costs associated with exiting the short-term rental
market. In particular, we would expect that it is relatively easy
for hosts supplying entire-home rentals to substitute toward
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35
To assess clarity of tax obligations, we searched for existing legislation,
policy memos, local news articles, or other government documents providing guidance to Airbnb hosts. We dropped jurisdictions for which we
could not find evidence that Airbnb hosts’ tax obligations were clear. These
jurisdictions are Phoenix, AZ; Scottsdale, AZ; Salt Lake City, UT; New
Orleans, LA; Hoboken, NJ; Tempe, AZ; Huntington Beach, CA; Mesa,
AZ; Fremont, CA; Weehawken, NJ; Culver City, CA; Sandy, UT; Costa
Mesa, CA; Lakewood, CO; Bethesda, MD; Cleveland Heights, OH; Silver
Spring, MD; Newark, NJ; West New York, NJ; Millcreek, UT; Lakewood,
OH; Golden, CO; and Metairie, LA. Tax obligations in Jersey City, NJ;
and San Diego, CA, were clarified in our sample period, so we dropped the
preclarification observations in those two jurisdictions.
36
Because we cannot use metro-month-year or county-month-year fixed
effects when restricting the sample in this way, the estimates presented in
table D5 are most comparable to those in column 3 of table 3.

C.

Heterogeneity by Listing Type and Relative Price

Next, we examine whether the estimated enforcement effects vary between entire-home and private-room listings, as
well as across the distribution of asking prices. These analyses aim to provide further insight into the Airbnb market
by asking which listings are more likely to evade taxation in
the absence of full enforcement and how elasticities and the
incidence of taxation differ across listings.
The first two columns of table D6 in appendix D present
the listing type heterogeneity results. In the first column, we
present the estimated effects of the enforced tax rate on booking price and nights booked using our preferred specification
and including only entire-home listings in the estimation sample; the second column repeats this but includes only privateroom listings in the estimation sample. In panel A, we show
that the negative booking price effect for entire-home listings
is substantially larger than for private-room listings: −0.289
(0.084) compared to −0.124 (0.037), respectively (standard
errors in parentheses). This suggests that private-room listings are more likely to evade taxation before enforcement and
pass a larger share of the tax onto renters after enforcement.
In panel B, we show that the negative nights booked effect
for entire-home listings is also substantially larger than for
private-room listings: −0.446 (0.276) compared to −0.063
(0.144), respectively. While the nights-booked estimates are
relatively imprecise and do not appear to be statistically indistinguishable from one another or 0, they do suggest that
both demand and supply for private-room listings are more
inelastic than for entire-home listings. This makes sense, as
private-room listings tend to be cheaper and there are fewer
outside options for both renters and hosts.
Columns 3 through 6 of table D6 present results that allow
for heterogeneity by asking price. Within each jurisdiction,
we assign properties to quartiles based on their sample-long
average asking prices. The estimates in panel A show that
the negative booking price effect is relatively small among
the lowest-priced listings at −0.165 (0.040), suggesting that
these properties are more likely to evade taxation before enforcement and pass a larger share of the tax onto renters after
enforcement. However, the effect of enforcement on booking
price is quite similar among listings in the second, third, and
fourth asking price quartiles at −0.232, −0.266, and −0.267,
respectively. In panel B, we see a consistently negative effect of enforcement on nights booked ranging from −0.118
to −0.522. Listings in the second quartile of asking prices
appear to experience the largest decrease in nights booked,
which may suggest that these listings have the closest substitutes. That said, the estimated enforcement effects on nights
booked are noisy and do not follow a clear pattern across the
asking price quartiles.
D.

Supply Responses

In this section, we explore whether supply-side responses
to tax enforcement are consistent with our main findings.
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price and nights booked to test whether individuals strategically booked reservations in anticipation of upcoming tax enforcement agreements. We do this by omitting the two months
around the start of the enforcement agreements. In column 6
we omit the first month that the tax goes into effect, and in
column 7 we also omit the last month prior to the tax enforcement agreement. Because the enforcement agreements were
generally only announced within a couple of weeks of the
enforcement date, omitting these two months should remove
any strategic-booking bias in our estimators. The estimated
effect of the enforced tax rate on booking price of −0.288, obtained after omitting both of these months, is slightly larger in
magnitude but not statistically distinguishable from our preferred estimate. The estimated effect on bookings of −0.228
is smaller in magnitude but again is not statistically distinguishable from our preferred estimate.
In tables D4 and D5 in appendix D, we present the
robustness of our central results to two additional concerns.
The first concern is that our low-compliance estimate is a
result of hosts operating in a legal gray area, which could
limit the generalizability of our results. To address this, we
reestimate our main results using a restricted sample of jurisdictions where hosts’ tax obligations were clear even in the
absence of an enforcement agreement.35 Using this restricted
sample, the estimated effect on booking price is −0.234.
The estimated effect on nights booked is −0.270, which is
slightly smaller and no longer statistically significant, but is
not statistically distinguishable from our preferred estimate
of −0.361. The second concern is that tax-induced substitution across jurisdictions within metro could lead us to overestimate the negative effects of enforcement agreements on
price and quantity. This would mean that our compliance upper bound is too conservative and that we are overestimating
the price elasticity of demand. We minimize the threat of
such spillover effects by reestimating our main results using a restricted sample that includes only the largest jurisdiction from each metro area. We find that the price and
quantity effects from the restricted sample are very similar in magnitude to the analogous estimates from table 3,
suggesting that our results are not exaggerated by spillover
effects.36
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TABLE 4.—SUPPLIER RESPONSES TO TAX AGREEMENTS
Panel A: Property-level Supply Estimates
ln(Asking Price)

ln(1 + Nights
Available)

−0.090*
(0.047)
1,987,813

−0.345*
(0.187)
2,586,260

Mean of DV
ln(1 + tax)
Observations

Entry
[0.059]

Exit
[0.021]

0.061**
(0.028)
2,450,458

0.002
(0.009)
2,450,458

Panel B: Jurisdiction-level Supply Estimates

ln(1 + tax)
Observations

Exit
[23.57]

Net Entry
[45.02]

Net Entry as
% of Properties
[0.046]

6.274
(7.138)
2,196

11.235*
(5.710)
2,196

−4.961
(4.414)
2,196

0.002
(0.003)
2,196

Estimates of supply-side responses. Estimates in panel A include metro-month-year fixed effects and property fixed effects. ln(Ask P) is the ln of the asking price. Nights Available is the number of nights the listing
was available. Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the first month a property appears in our sample. Exit is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the last month that a property is listed on the site. In panel B, we aggregate
to the jurisdiction-month level. We include jurisdiction fixed effects and metro-month-year fixed effects. Entry measures the number of new listings added to the site in a given jurisdiction-month-year. Exit measures
the number of listings removed from the site in a given jurisdiction-month-year. Net Entry as % of Properties is measured as Net Entry divided by the number of properties listed in the previous month. The Entry
and Exit samples omit the first and last month of our sample period. We apply the same sample restrictions as in the main sample. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the tax jurisdiction level. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗ p < 0.10.

First, we examine asking prices to determine whether there is
indeed a reduction in the price hosts are willing to accept after
an enforcement agreement relieves them of their statutory tax
burden. Second, we estimate the effect of enforcement on the
number of nights available per property-month to determine
whether there is an intensive-margin supply response. Third,
we estimate entry and exit effects to determine whether there
is evidence of a contemporaneous negative extensive-margin
supply response to tax enforcement, which would threaten
the validity of our estimated upper bound on pre-enforcement
compliance.37
In column 1 of table 4 (panel A), we present the effect of
enforcement on hosts’ asking prices using our preferred specification including property fixed effects and metro-monthyear fixed effects. We find that a 1 percentage point increase
in the enforced tax rate reduces hosts’ asking prices by an average of 0.09%, which is statistically significant at the 10%
level. This is consistent with the notion that shifting the statutory tax burden away from hosts toward renters reduces the
prices hosts are willing to accept, since they are no longer
directly responsible for collecting and remitting taxes.
Turning to column 2 in panel A of table 4, we present
the estimated effect of enforcement on the number of nights
available per property-month from our preferred specification. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the enforced tax rate reduces nights available per month by 0.345%,
or 0.07 nights relative to the mean of 19.7. While one may
be concerned that reduced availability is contributing to the
negative effect of tax enforcement on nights booked, the large
excess capacity present in the market suggests that this is not
the case. In particular, the average number of nights booked
per property-month (6.05) is less than a third of the number of nights available per property-month (19.7). Moreover,
looking at the daily-level data by tax jurisdiction, the 75th
percentile of the proportion of properties booked in a given
37

See our treatment of entry and exit in appendix A for details.

day in a given jurisdiction is 35%, the 99th percentile is 61%,
and the highest observed value is 83%.
Then we estimate the effects of enforcement on the entry
and exit of listings. We estimate entry using a binary outcome
variable that equals 1 in the first month a listing is observed
in our data and 0 otherwise. In column 3 (panel A), we find
that a 1 percentage point increase in the enforced tax rate
increases the proportion of new listings in a given month by
0.061 percentage points, which is roughly 1% relative to the
sample mean of 0.059. Similarly, we estimate exit using a
binary outcome variable that equals 1 in the last month a
listing is observed in our data and 0 otherwise.38 In column 4
(panel A), we find a relatively precisely estimated null effect
on exit.
Next, we estimate entry and exit effects at the jurisdictionmonth level. The outcomes in the first two columns of panel
B are the number of entries and exits. Here, we find statistically insignificant evidence of increased entry and marginally
statistically significant evidence of increased exit: enforcing
a 10% tax increases the number of new listings by 0.6 per
jurisdiction-month and the number of listings that are removed by 1.1 per jurisdiction-month. While these estimates
suggest that the net effect on supply along the extensive margin is negative (−0.5, as shown in column 3 of panel B), the
estimate is not statistically significant at conventional levels. It also appears to be economically insignificant considering that in our main estimation sample, 1,118 properties
are listed in a given jurisdiction-month on average. To address the concern that the distribution of listing flows across
jurisdictions may be positively skewed, we also estimate the
effect on the ratio of net entry to the number of listings in
38
For both our entry and exit regressions, we generate the binary entry and
exit variables using the full sample period. We then omit the first and last
months of our sample to estimate entry and exit, since we cannot determine
month of entry among properties present in the first month of our data or
determine exit among properties that are present in the final month of our
data.
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the previous month. The estimate presented in column 4,
which is not statistically significant at conventional levels,
suggests that enforcing a 10% tax increases the rate of net
entry by 0.02 percentage points (or 0.0002 × 1,118 = 0.22
new listings per jurisdiction-month). Overall, the very small
estimates and weak statistical significance suggest that the
enforcement agreements have no meaningful negative effect
on supply along the extensive margin.
Welfare Implications

We use our estimates of the price elasticities of supply and
demand to shed light on the welfare effects of Airbnb tax enforcement agreements assuming linear supply and demand.
We consider this an important exercise given how little is
known about short-term rental markets and, more broadly,
the excess burden from taxing online markets. In the textbook setting, the introduction of a tax will generally increase
government revenue but generate a net loss in social surplus. Using information on tax rates, bookings, and booking
prices, we first calculate the tax revenue generated among
the treated jurisdictions in our sample. Then we calculate the
implied associated deadweight loss (DWL).
In our estimation sample, there are 1,649,891 propertymonth observations, spanning 38 jurisdictions, with a
nonzero enforced tax rate. Among these observations, the
average booking price is $137, the average number of nights
booked per month is 5.90, and the average enforced tax
rate is 11.22%. Thus, the average listing subjected to a
tax enforcement agreement generates $91 in tax revenue
each month.39 Given that the average number of listings per
jurisdiction-month is 2,245 across the posttreatment months,
we calculate that the average treated jurisdiction received
roughly $204,000 per month in tax revenue from Airbnb listings. This translates to roughly $149.8 million total across
the 735 jurisdiction-months subjected to a tax enforcement
agreement. However, this reflects all revenue collected from
Airbnb listings after an enforcement agreement was implemented, which overstates the additional revenue generated
by the agreements to the extent that taxes were paid on some
transactions beforehand. Using our estimated upper bound of
pre-enforcement compliance of 24%, we calculate that enforcement agreements increased revenue by at least $69 per
property-month, or roughly $155,000 per jurisdiction-month.
Next, we turn to calculating the excess burden (DWL) from
taxing the Airbnb market, as well as the marginal DWL created by the tax enforcement agreements, for three different
values of pre-enforcement compliance (λ). These values in39
Note that this does not include any revenue that may be generated by
taxing cleaning fees and extra person fees, which are also subject to taxation
under the enforcement agreements. While we can calculate the tax revenue
generated from cleaning fees, we do not have information on whether a
fee was paid for extra people. For the purposes of this exercise, which is
comparing the tax revenue generated to the DWL generated, we consider
tax revenues generated from nightly booking prices to be the most relevant
consideration.

clude the lower bound, λ = 0, the upper bound, λ = 0.24,
and the implied rate of compliance when the price elasticity of supply is 2.16, as estimated by Farronato and Fradkin
(2018), λ = 0.07.40
The first step is to derive a linear approximation of the
demand curve for the average treated listing using the estimated demand elasticity of −0.48, the post-enforcement taxinclusive average booking price of $137 × (1 + 0.1122) =
$152.37, and the post-enforcement average nights booked
of 5.9. Using these three inputs, the inverse demand curve
is given by P = 440.79 − 48.88Q. The second step is to
derive three hypothetical linear approximations of the supply curve for the average treated listing: one for each λ ∈
{0, 0.07, 0.24}. This derivation uses the post-enforcement
tax-exclusive average booking price of $137, average nights
booked of 5.9, and the price elasticity of supply associated with each hypothetical value of λ: 1.5, 2.16, and ∞,
respectively.41 We calculate that the inverse supply curve
is given by P = 45.92 + 15.44Q when supply = 1.5, P =
73.57 + 10.75Q when supply = 2.16, and P = 137 when
supply = ∞. With these inverse supply and demand functions, we can solve for the no-tax equilibrium in each hypothetical case, which then allows us to solve for the DWL from
taxing the Airbnb market.
We summarize the results of this exercise in table D7 in appendix D, which presents the hypothetical no-tax equilibrium
for each price elasticity of supply, partial, and full-compliance
DWL per property-month, and the implied share of the tax
burden borne by consumers. In the first row, we present the
calculated values of interest given λ = 0 and supply = 1.5,
which entails a no-tax equilibrium booking price of $140.69
and a no-tax equilibrium quantity of 6.14 nights booked per
property-month. Note that in this scenario, where compliance is 0 in the absence of an enforcement agreement, the
no-tax equilibrium is the same as the counterfactual “partialcompliance” equilibrium. Thus, the total DWL from taxing
the Airbnb market, $1.84 per property-month, is equal to the
marginal DWL associated with enforcement. In this scenario,
consumers bear 76% of the economic tax burden.42 This scenario yields a lower bound on the DWL created by taxing
40
To calculate this implied value of λ, we must calculate the portion of the
estimated price effect attributable to a shift rather than a movement along
the supply curve where the “true” elasticity is 2.16. Figure 1b illustrates that
λt is less than or equal to the difference between the actual effect of enforcement on price and the corresponding change in price from moving along the
pre-enforcement supply curve by Q. Both price changes can be calculated
as movements along alternative supply curves with different elasticities. For
the former, we use our supply elasticity lower bound of 1.5 (the implied
elasticity when λ = 0; see figure 1d). For the latter, we use the 2.16 estimate.
Then, rearranging the elasticity formula (s = (Q/P)(P/Q)), we obtain
λt = (Q/1.5)(P/Q) − (Q/2.16)(P/Q). Substituting t = τP and Q =
Qτγq reduces this to λ = γq /1.5 − γq /2.16 = 0.361/1.5 − 0.361/2.16 =
0.07.
41
Recall that the price elasticity of supply lower bound is 1.5 when preenforcement compliance is 0, and that the price elasticity of the supply
upper bound is ∞ at the compliance upper bound of 24%. See note 40 for
the math that links the price elasticity of supply of 2.16 to λ = 0.07.
42
We derive this incidence using the following calculation: 1 +
demand
.
supply −demand
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43
Counterfactual total DWL is determined using post-enforcement average nights booked per property-month, the imputed counterfactual average
nights booked per-property month of 6.14, and the wedge between the taxinclusive and tax-exclusive price of $1.12. See note 40 for the calculation
of the latter two parameters.
44
Counterfactual
DWL
= 0.5 × (6.21 − 6.14) × ($137 · 0.1122 ·
0.24) = $0.14 per property-month.

VI.

Conclusion

In this paper, we develop a simple approach to bound preenforcement tax compliance using prices before and after a
change from partial to full compliance. We illustrate this approach using Airbnb tax enforcement agreements with state
and local governments, where full enforcement is achieved by
shifting the statutory tax burden away from individual hosts
toward renters via the platform. We also show that researchers
can use a similar approach to study the broad range of markets affected by the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., which enables states to fully
enforce sales and use taxes on online transactions. Exploiting variation in Airbnb tax enforcement agreements, we use
a difference-in-differences framework to estimate the agreements’ effects on booking price and quantity. We find that
enforcing a 10% tax reduces the price hosts receive by 2.4%
and increases the price renters pay by 7.6%. This price effect
implies an upper bound of 24% compliance in the absence of
an enforcement agreement.
We also find that enforcement of a 10% tax reduces nights
booked by 3.6%. Combining this with the estimated price
effect, we calculate a price elasticity of demand of −0.48. If
Airbnb hosts are price takers, these estimates yield a lower
bound of 1.5 on the price elasticity of supply. This estimate is
consistent with the estimated Airbnb price elasticity of supply
of 2.16 from Farronato and Fradkin (2018). If we assume
that 2.16 is the true supply elasticity, our results imply that
taxes are only paid on 7% of Airbnb transactions before an
enforcement agreement is implemented.
Overall, these results suggest that Airbnb tax collection
agreements can substantially increase tax compliance, as at
least 76% of transactions evade taxation pre-enforcement.
This implies an increase in tax revenue of at least $69 per
property-month, or $155,000 per jurisdiction-month. Moreover, taxing Airbnb listings imposes a relatively small efficiency cost on the local market of $0.03 per dollar of additional revenue. Because demand is much less elastic than
supply, consumers (tourists) bear more of the tax burden than
hosts (locals). This may be a desirable feature for state and
local policymakers, as the additional revenue and inefficiency
associated with taxation is disproportionately borne by visitors. However, our results also suggest that taxing Airbnb is a
relatively ineffective policy lever for interest groups seeking
to stifle the Airbnb market.
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